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INTRODUCTION 
By Order dated May 1, 1990, the Supreme Court 
authorized this Supplementary Brief to address specific issues 
which relate to the mechanics of the guilty plea on February 1, 
1984. Mr. Earle's knowing and voluntary entry of a guilty plea 
is analyzed in Point III (pages 33-38) of petitioner's 
original brief. This supplementary brief augments and 
highlights that prior discussion. 
On May 1st, the Court authorized supplementary 
briefing on three issues. However, this supplementary brief 
addresses only two of those issues. After further analysis, it 
has been determined that no reversible error occurred with 
regard to whether the plea was properly tendered by the 
prosecution or whether the plea was made without undue 
influence or involvement of the trial court. 
With regard to the other two issues, reversible error 
definitely occurred in the process of taking the guilty pleas. 
As demonstrated in Point I below, the Defendant's Affidavit was 
woefully inadequate in listing the elements of the charged 
crimes, and the trial court's examination of Mr. Earle on this 
important plea element was superficial at best. In Point II, 
below, it is shown that the description of Mr. Earle's conduct 
in the Defendant's Affidavit was not only factually inaccurate, 
but also legally inadequate. The trial court made no follow-up 
inquiry on this required plea element. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT DID NOT FULLY 
OR ACCURATELY ADDRESS THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CHARGED CRIMES TO WHICH HE PLEAD GUILTY 
One of the requirements at the time Mr. Earle entered 
his guilty plea was that a defendant must understand the 
nature and elements of the offense to which he is pleading 
guilty. U.C.A. § 77-35-ll(e)(4) (Supp. 1980). This 
requirement flows from federal constitutional standards that a 
plea cannot be knowing and voluntary unless a defendant 
understands the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), 
aff'd., 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989), this court outlined the 
statutory requirements of a proper plea under U.C.A. 
§ 77-35-11. A plea cannot be considered voluntary unless a 
defendant receives notice of the nature of the charges against 
him, and the court affirmatively determines that the conduct 
which defendant admits actually satisfies the elements of the 
crimes charged. In the process of taking a proper guilty plea, 
written affidavits may be used, but the court must still 
determine affirmatively and on the record that the defendant 
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understands the charges and admits to the requisite conduct to 
satisfy those charges. State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 
(Utah Ct.App. 1988)# cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). The 
court cannot rely upon defendant's attorney in ascertaining 
these two critical elements of a proper plea. Id. 
The court in Gibbons requires strict compliance 
with the plea requirements. However, in State v. 
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 1988), the court 
held that pleas entered prior to Gibbons need only show by 
the "record as a whole" that a defendant knew and understood 
the crime and elements charged as well as the consequences of 
his plea in order for the plea to be considered voluntary. 
This is absolutely essential for a plea which meets 
constitutional and statutory muster. State v. Copeland, 765 
P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) (elements of crime not listed in 
affidavit or on the record); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (defendant claimed that the court 
failed to find he understood the nature and elements of the 
offenses charged and failed to determine if he understood the 
possibility of consecutive sentences); Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) (defendant claimed the court failed to 
determine he understood the nature and elements of the offenses 
charged and failed to determine if he understood the 
possibility of consecutive sentences). 
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Even under the pre-Gibbons standard of substantial 
compliance, neither the Defendant's Affidavit, nor the trial 
court satisfied the requirement of proper description of the 
elements of the crime. A copy of the Affidavit appears as 
pages 031-032 in the record of both of the district court cases 
(CR83-1541 and CR83-1542). Copies of those pages of the record 
are included at Appendix "A" to this brief. An examination 
shows that there was only one Affidavit prepared to cover both 
cases. The only difference between the two records is the 
circling of one of the two case numbers at the top right-hand 
corner of the Affidavit. 
Before addressing the defects in listing of the 
elements of the crime, it is worth emphasizing that because 
only one Affidavit was filled out for both pleas, and because 
the Affidavit indicates that the punishment may only be "1-15 
years," Mr. Earle was justifiably astonished when he was 
eventually sentenced to consecutive terms of one-fifteen 
years. See pp. 35-36, Point III, of petitioner's original 
brief. Failure to clearly inform the defendant of the maximum 
possible sentences is reversible error. State v. 
Vasilacopulos, supra. This failure is patent on the face 
of Defendant's Affidavit. 
Now, with regard to the elements of the crimes, 
aggravated exploitation of prostitution is described on the 
Affidavit as follows: 
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1) Any person who expl. 
2) Anyone for purpus (sic) of 
3) prostitution = Agg Exp of Prostitution 
The actual statutory elements of this crime were found at the 
time of the plea in U.C.A. § 76-10-1306 (Supp. 1973). 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
exploitation if: 
(a) In committing an act of exploiting 
prostitution, as defined in 
§ 76-10-1305, he uses any force, 
threat, or fear against any person; or 
(b) The person procured, transported, 
orpersuaded or with whom he shares the 
proceeds of prostitution is under 18 
years of age or is the wife of the 
actor. 
And exploiting prostitution is defined as follows under U.C.A. 
§ 76-10-1305 (Supp. 1973): 
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting 
prostitution if he: 
(a) Procures an inmate for a house 
of prostitution or place in a house 
of prostitution for one who would 
be an inmate; or 
(b) Encourages, induces or 
otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
or 
(c) Transports a person into or 
within this state with the purpose 
to promote that person's engaging 
in prostitution or procuring or 
paying for transportation with that 
purpose; or 
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(d) Not being a child or legal 
dependent of a prostitute, shares 
the proceeds of prostitution with 
the prostitute pursuant to their 
understanding that he is to share 
therein. 
(e) Owns, controls, manages, 
supervises or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with 
another, a house of prostitution or 
a prostitution business. 
In contrast with this explicit statutory definition, 
the Defendant's Affidavit is grossly inadequate. The Affidavit 
lists none of the specific elements. In essence, it is merely 
a conclusion of the crime using the title to define the crime 
itself. The Affidavit's definition wouldn't satisfy a 7th 
grade vocabulary exam, and it certainly doesn't fulfill the 
Constitutional and statutory requirements of due process. 
The Defendant's Affidavit is similarly inadequate in 
its definition of attempted aggravated kidnapping. The 
language is as follows: 
1) Any person 
2) who attempts 
3) to hold anyone 
4) without consent = att. agg kid. 
The statutory requirements for this charge are also a 
combination of two separate criminal statutes. Aggregated 
kidnapping is defined in U.C.A. § 76-5-302 (Supp. 1983), and 
the crime of attempt is found at U.C.A. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 
1973) . The aggregated kidnapping statute reads as follows: 
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(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping 
if the person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the 
will of the victim, by any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, details, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or 
as a shield for hostage, or to compel 
a third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to forebear from engaging 
in particular conduct; on 
(b) To facilitate the commission, 
attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of 
a felony; or 
(c) To inflict bodily injury or or to 
terrorize the victim or another; or 
(d) To interfere with the performance 
of any governmental or political 
function. 
(e) To commit a sexual offense as 
described in part 4 of this chapter. 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be 
the result of force, threat, or deceit if 
the victim is mentally incompetent or 
younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without; 
the effective consent of the victim's 
custodial parent, guardian, or person 
acting in loco parentis to the victim. 
The crime of attempt is defined as: 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step towards 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does 
not constitute a substantial step unless it 
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is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense* 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt 
shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility, if the defense could 
have been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor 
believed them to be. 
Here again, the description of attempted aggravated 
kidnapping in the Defendant's Affidavit is totally deficient. 
The specific elements of aggravated kidnapping and attempt are 
not listed. The mens rea elements of aggravated kidnapping 
and attempt are not mentioned. The definition is merely a 
conclusion which uses the name of the crime (complete with 
informally abbreviated terms) to define the crime itself. 
The transcript of the plea hearing on February 1, 
1984, demonstrates that the trial court did not insure that 
Mr. Earle understood the elements of the crimes charged. 
(See transcript at Appendix "B.") At the hearing, 
Mr. Earle's counsel presented the Defendant's Affidavit to the 
trial court and represented as follows: 
We have, we being myself and Mr. Earle 
have, prepared an affidavit, and have gone 
over that affidavit. Mr. Earle understands 
his constitutional rights, understands the 
maximum possible penalties of the two 
charges and is prepared at this particular 
time to sign the affidavit in open court. 
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Appendix "B" at p. 3. 
No mention is made here of the elements of the 
crimes. The trial court did not follow up to insure that the 
elements were accurately stated and fully understood by the 
defendant. The closest the trial court came to addressing the 
elements of the crimes was in the following exchange: 
THE COURT: Have you gone over an affidavit 
with your attorney? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I have. 
THE COURT: And do you understand the 
contents of that document? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand if you sign 
that you will be pleading guilty as I have 
stated to you? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
The procedure followed by the trial court will not 
do. In State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983), this 
Court discussed the importance of the defendant's understanding 
of the nature and elements of the crimes to which he pleads 
guilty. Breckenridge involved arson. At the time of the 
plea, the court explained the elements of arson, including the 
unlawful and intentional damage to property by means of fire. 
The defendant said he understood these element. The trial 
court then asked the defendant to explain what happened at the 
time of the fire. The defendant admitted setting fire to some 
garbage at the back of the property where he worked, but that 
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the fire got out of control and defeated the defendants 
attempts to put it out. Defendant then plead guilty, and he 
was convicted and sentenced by the trial court on the basis of 
that plea. 
On appeal, this Court recognized that the defendant's 
explanation of the fire was totally at odds with his statement 
that he understood the elements of arson which included 
intentional damage to property by means of fire. The Court 
said: 
The [trial] court has an undoubted duty to 
guard against the possibility that an 
accused who is innocent of the crime 
charged may be induced to plead guilty 
without sufficient understanding of the 
nature of the charge or the consequences of 
his plea. 
688 P.2d at 443. The defendants plea in Breckenridge was 
properly set aside and his conviction was vacated. 
The same result should obtain in this case. 
Mr. Earle was less informed of the elements of the charged 
crimes than the defendant in Breckenridge. The Defendant's 
Affidavit contributes nothing to an intelligent understanding 
of the elements of the crime. Neither the comments of defense 
counsel nor the inquiry of the trial court on February 1, 1984, 
were adequate to meet the standard which would allow a knowing 
entry of guilty plea. Mr. Earle's guilty plea should be set 
aside, and his conviction should be vacated. 
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POINT II 
THE DESCRIPTION OF CONDUCT IN THE 
DEFENDANTS AFFIDAVIT WAS INADEQUATE 
TO ESTABLISH COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES 
AND KNOWING ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE CRIMES 
The requirement that the defendant's admitted conduct 
satisfy the elements of the charged crimes really grows out of 
and is a dependent upon the standard for full and proper 
description of the crimes. The Defendant's Affidavit fails by 
a mile to hit this critical element. The Affidavit (see 
Appendix "A") simply states as follows: 
I, Robert Bradbury, AKA Anthony Earle, 
aided and abetted others in the acts 
described. 
In fact, no "acts" are described in the Affidavit. If "acts" 
refers to the elements of the crimes which are listed on the 
Affidavit, then the deficient description of defendant's 
conduct fails doubly by reliance upon a deficient definition of 
the crimes. (See Point I, supra.) 
Even if the Affidavit adequately and accurately 
described Mr. Earle's conduct, the Affidavit itself cannot 
serve as a substitute for full and complete examination on the 
record by the trial court in order to establish a knowing and 
voluntary entry into the plea. State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 
1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). It is the trial court's burden to 
insure both that the crimes are adequately described and that 
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the conduct to which the defendant pleads satisfies the 
elements of those crimes. State v. Gibbons, State v. 
Vasicopulos, supra. At the hearing on February 1, 1984, 
neither defense counsel nor the trial court made even a pretext 
of an effort to confirm that Mr. Earle's actual conduct 
satisfied the crimes with which he was charged. (See record 
of hearing at Appendix "B.") 
It is also unclear in the Affidavit as to what is 
meant by "aiding and abetting." That crime was defined at the 
time of Mr. Earle's guilty plea as follows: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense, shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
U.C.A. § 76-2-202 (Supp. 1973). It is inconceivable, 
especially in a case such as Mr. Earle's where he had at least 
two other co-defendants who were indicted and arraigned on the 
same charges, that the conduct element of the plea could be 
satisfied by the label of "aiding and abetting" without some 
inquiry as to Mr. Earle's interaction with other perpetrators 
of the crime. The cursory label which the Defendant's 
Affidavit gives to Mr. Earle's conduct, and the complete 
absence of any discussion of conduct on the record, 
demonstrates a wholesale failure to satisfy this required 
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element of a proper guilty plea. Mr, Earle's plea should be 
set aside and his conviction vacated, 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental objective of the constitutional and 
statutory guidelines for a proper plea has to be that no 
unwitting defendants are convicted of crimes which they did not 
actually commit. This goal cannot be achieved unless the 
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. The plea cannot be 
knowing unless the defendant understands the specific elements 
of the crime. The plea cannot be voluntary unless the 
defendant's conduct actually satisfies the elements of the 
charged crime. 
Were this not the case, a guilty plea would be, in 
essence, merely a confession. In order to be legitimate, the 
law must be concerned with objective standards of truth. A 
defendant's "confession" in the face of the intimidating, 
confusing, and powerful presence of society's police force will 
not preserve the moral imperative which is the foundation of 
all legitimate government. Society can only preserve its 
legitimacy by self-restrained application of its laws. Holding 
itself to the articulated, objective standards of valid 
criminal pleas is a fundamental aspect of society's proper 
self-restraint. 
Mr. Earle's "confession" cannot absolve the 
prosecutor, the trial court, and indeed, defense counsel, from 
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their collective duty to insure that true justice is done. An 
arrangement of convenience which is premised upon well meaning 
calculations of legal risk will not suffice. Mr. Earle's 
incarceration under these circumstances is not legitimate, and 
this Court should act immediately to rectify the continuing 
injustice. 
DATED this f^ day of May, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
IT7TER16KS, 
:torneys for Anthony Earle 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f4 daY o f Aty . 1990, foregoing t o B e mailed I caused a true and correct copy of the o n   He ail
first-class, postage prepaid to the following: 
Barbara Bearnson 
Attorney General•s Office 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
EARLE1.1/RCF 
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APPENDIX "A" 
T$*g&»**i 
guilty to rhe charts / of: 
, under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea ol 
elements: Facts: ^ 
Attf////<"/ 4t4-
i 
!f^ Jjf4iffAdA&~ A&4&44*di?d ' 
TdJ8%t*A.£^* 
I have received a copy of the cha 
i*r 
ze (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guiltv to is a 
(Degree ot Felony 
3nd understand ;he punishment tor this cr.me may be 
oi »>on term. . 
fir i lass tf M isdemeanor) 
fine/or borh. I am no 
My pita of guilts is freely and voluntarily made I am represented by Attnrncy f^fUx O € 
who ru* explained my rights to me and ! understand them. 
1 I know tnat I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
hav< entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2 1 know tnat if I wish to r .e a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against mc in open court in m\ 
prr nee and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my atton v. I also 
know that i have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my rvnalt and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury will be told that this mav not »<e held 
against me 
3 ! know tnat if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
be\ond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that ot guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4 i know ihat under the constitution that I have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this me.nisthtV 
1 ca mot be compelled to admit that 1 have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unit* ! ?h »:• v. 
to do so. 
5 I know that under the constitution of Utah that it 1 were tried and convi ed by a jur\ or by the M»!/" 'hat I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme court of Utah for review o* ine trip1 
proceedings and that if I cocld not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid hv th 
State without cost to me. 
6 I know anu understand that by entering a plea of guilty 1 am giving up m\ constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ot the crime to which my pica ot guiltv ;s entered. 
? I also know mat if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense ol which I have Serf. 
cf '.victed or to which I have nlead guilty, my plea in the present action . ay r - ult in consecutive sentences heir P 
imposed or ,»e. . -, ,- <~, , 
8 1 know that the fact that 1 have entered a pleaofguii > does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence ot imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9 No promise* or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): . 
# - / * $ - & ~ 
will ne'iismibseu. ar.d that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which 
are now know.i to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, deluding a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or coun , el for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. 1 have reaJ this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I 
am —j&mL— vcars of age, have attended school through the /& £Tmf\*4
 an(j \ c a n reacj ancj 
'/•ted this 
understand the Knglish language. 
ft 
,av of 
Subscribed anu uorn to before me in Court this 
< FRIIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTO 
I certifv that ! am the attorney for KiTlLLA^C **^*UAAAAJ*y~> , the detendant named above and I know », 
lead the Affidavit, or that 1 have read it to him, and I discu a^fed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
,.,-aning of its content and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my know ieuge and belief the statements. 
representations and declarations made by the d#fe«dant in the foreatftTta Affidavit are in all respect* accurate \nd true 
fenxnp 
se Attornev 
&LL < FRTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against 
nave reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accuse, 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable ciuse to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of .he pka 
would serve the public interest. 
. detendant 
No improper 
L£LA**^3L23e-siJcZu /^ 
Prosecuting Attornev 
ORDER 
Rased upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds :he defendant'* plea c,\ 
cuiltv is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set fort!, m the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. ^ ^ . r* 
^ ^ . _ . I 9 1_T Done in Court this 
- / - dav of 
District Judee 
OOC J 2 
1 HE STATE" 
Plamtilf 
H 
vit of Defendant 
Criminal No ^ 3 , " " " / ^ ' > 
£ . under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea ol 
euiitv to the chargeis) of 
s»-,/<-W-' &£.%$.rijfa&SXJi^ J ffl.d^-lQlhfi*fu**t 
Elements 
•;*?/ /l^Ly ;&4^o ^ ? - ^ g / -
Facts 
AjLluA 
Vs/74s*y 
4t4~ 
4 fy&ff AdU^ Oj^JM^JLeA-L rf0*fiU>U> 
^ 
^cy w?/ 
•^ 1 have received a cop\ ol the chaTgc (Intormation) and understand the crime I am pleading guiltv to is a 
: /^Y^r- — 
(Degree ^i Felony ^Jr C lass o\ Misdemeanor) 
ind understand (he pum.shment !or this crime may be 
. p. ixon term. tyfoP'"* linef or both I am not/on (drugs t.i uwonol 
Mv plea o! guilt\ is trcciy and voluntarily made I am rcp'cscntcd by Attorney r^CXji o e r*n, 
\wno has explained mv rights to me and I understand them 
1 1 know that 1 have a constitutional neht to plead not guiltv and to have a iury trial upon the charge :<> -A Inch I 
have entered a plea ot guiltv. or to a trial by a |udge should I desire 
2 1 know that il" 1 wish to h .a ' a trial 1 have a right to sec and hear the witnesses against me in open . >ur\ :n mv 
p too nee and bet ore the Judge and iur\ A uh the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my aiiornev I also 
know that 1 have a right to have mv witnesses subpoenaed at btate expense to testily in court upon mv V-hail and 
that I could testify on my own behalt. and that il 1 choose not to do so. thejury will be told that this ma\ not he held 
against me 
) 1 know that if I were to have a trial thai the prosecutor must prove each and every clement of the c;,ci, i barged 
he\ ond a reasonable doubt, that anv verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that ol guiltv or not guilt;. .; i^t be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors 
4 1 know that under the constitution that I haven right not to give evidence against mvself and that this Means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I J.'.oose 
10 dO s o 
5 ! know that under the constitution of Utah that it I were tried and convicted by a jur\ or bv the J KJLI'J that 1 
would have a right to appeal mv conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah tor review oj n c trial 
proceedings ind that if I could not atford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by ;hc 
State without cost to me 
6 I know and understand that bv cnteung a pica ol guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as >et o :: n ;hc 
preceedma paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ol the crime to which my pica ol guile > enured 
I also k now that it 1 am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another olfense ol whici I \ i . e been 
convicted or to which 1 have plead guiltv my plea in the present action may result inconsecutive ^cir.cii'.c. being 
imposed on ,»e 
< i i r ~ ; . . i n i 
or sentence 01 imprisonment upon me anu nu pi umiicb nave occn maac io mc oy anyone as :o wnat ir.e seme nee w wi 
be. 
9 No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
pending against mc, to-wii: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): 
" it-us** 
will be dismissed, and that no other Charcots) will be filed against me for other crimes 1 may have commixed which 
are now known to the prosecuting attornev i am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought b\ either delensc counsel or counsel for the Stale, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge 
JO I have read (his Allidavu. or I have had it read to mc by my attorney, and 1 know and understand us contents i 
am /LA* vcars of age. have attended school through the Z& QllfrLsf
 a n ( j j c a n r. :acj j n c j 
understand the Knuhsh iamzuuL'e. 
Dated this i± C.AV Ol 
Defendant 
Subscribed and sworn to betore me in Court this. .day o 
l aan t ^^^ - ^ . 
r 7 > ^ ' 19 il 
•M—r^^-
Judge 
< KRUFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
the defendant named above anu I know i,v« I certify that I am the attorney for 
'.,o iead the Aifidavit, or that I have read it to him. and I discu^afcd it with him and believe he fully understands tht 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements. 
representations and declarations made by the Affidavit are in ail respecu accurate and :ruc. 
se Attornev 
PJMJ it* 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certifv that I am the attorney for the State of Utah m its case against /v &\ **) L^it^iLtuu , dctendant. 
I have reviewed the .Affidavit oi the defendant and find that the declarations arc true and accura/e. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence vvould support the conviction of the defendant for the pica offered, and that acceptance of ;he plea 
would serve the public interest. 
La 
Prosecuting Attorney 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth m the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea ol 
guilts is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set lorth in the 
Aifidavit be accepted and entered. . r* 
J ^TZ'^-' * 
Done in Court this JL day of p^ . 19 . 
r 
/ District Judue 
i .4 »< • A ^ J 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v s . ) Criminal No. CR83-1541 
ROBERT EDWARD BRADBURY, aka 
ANTHONY S. EARL, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . Criminal No. CR83-1542 
ROBERT EDWARD BRADBURY, aka 
ANTHONY S. EARL, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled cause 
came on regularly on the daily motion calendar for a change 
of plea before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, a Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, at 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 1st 
day of February, 1984, at 9:00 a.m., and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the P l a i n t i f f : 
For the Defendant: 
Carvel R. Harward, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City , Utah 84111 
David C. Biggs , Esq. 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Assoc ia t ion 
333 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City , Utah 84111 
* * * 
Edward Bradbury 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Robert 
MR. BIGGS: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. HARWARD: Carvel Harward for the 
State. 
MR. BIGGS: David Biggs , your Honor. 
Mr. Bradbury's true and correct name i s Anthony 
Samuel Earl . I be l ieve that was placed in both f i l e s . 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. I only have 
one f i l e , Andy. We have to get the other f i l e . 
I guess we better take a five-minute recess and 
get the f i l e . 
(Short r e c e s s . ) 
THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel. 
AI.AN l> r,MITH, CSR 
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MR. HARWARD: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BIGGS: David Biggs for Mr. Earl. 
We are here today to enter a plea in both files, 
your Honor, in the following: 
In File No. 83-1541 there will be a plea as charge 
in count two, aggravated exploitation of prostitution, second 
degree felony. The other two counts in that particular in-
formation will be dismissed. 
In the other file, your Honor, 83-1542, there will] 
be a plea to a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated 
kidnapping in count one, and count two will be dismissed.. We 
have, we being myself and Mr. Earl have, prepared an affidavit, 
have gone over that affidavit. Mr. Earl understands his 
constitutional rights, understands the maximum possible penal-
ties of the two charges and is prepared at this particular time 
to sign the affidavit in open court. 
THE COURT: Mr. Harward. 
MR. HARWARD: That is the arrangement, your 
Honor. If the Court accepts that, and the lesser included of-
fense that defendant is pleading to in 1942 is also a second 
degree felony, so he is pleading to two second degree felonies. 
MR. BIGGS: That is correct, your Honor. 
MR. HARWARD: And I have been the prose-
cutor on the case since the time it was filed and in my opinion 
this is a just disposition considering all of the circumstances!. 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
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The victims are aware of what we are doing and havp 
been made aware of the intended plea bargain and it is accept-
able to the victims. 
THE COURT: And they feel comfortable 
with it? 
MR. HARWARD: Yes. I should mention as 
to Brenda Price, the main victim in 1941, there are medical 
bills in the approximate amount of $300 and we will be asking 
for that as restitution. There are three different defendants 
and I donft know how that will be allocated, but as part of 
the sentencing of the three defendants we will want restitution 
of the out-of-pocket expenses of Brenda Price. And Mr. Earle 
acknowledges that, your Honor, and is prepared to pay his 
share. 
THE COURT: Again, Mr. Harward, you feel 
that this is done in the interest of justice and the victim 
is aware of it, what is taking place? 
MR. HARWARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you are recommending 
this to the Court? 
MR. HARWARD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Sir, you have heard the repre-
sentations made by your attorney and agreed to by the State 
indicated that it is your desire to plead guilty in Case No. 
83-1541 to count two, aggravated exploitation of prostitution, 
ALAN P SMITH CSR ^ 
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10 
1 a second degree felony, and upon your doing so count one, 
2 aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony, and count 
three, aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, would 
4 I be dismissed. 
5 MR. EARLE: That is right. 
6 J THE COURT: Also in Case No. 83-1542 you 
would be pleading guilty to an amended count one of attempted 
8 I aggravated kidnapping, a second degree felony, and the State 
9 J would move to amend count one from aggravated kidnapping, 
a first degree felony, and move to dismiss count two, aggra-
7 
11 I vated sexual assault, a first degree felony. Is that your 
12 I intent, sir? 
13 MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, it is. 
14 THE COURT: Have you gone over an affi-
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
23 
davit with your attorney? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I have. 
17 THE COURT: And do you understand the 
contents of that document? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand if you sign 
2i j that you will be pleading guilty as I have stated to you? 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor, I do. 
THE COURT: You will be waiving your 
24 | right to a trial, your right to confront the witnesses, your 
right to appeal to a higher court. 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
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you were to go to 
compelled to take 
influence ) of any 
that would impair 
own free will and 
MR. 
THE 
EARLE: 
COURT: 
Yes 
You 
, your Honor, I do. 
also understand that if 
trial in this matter you would 
the 
MR. 
THE 
type 
witness 
EARLE: 
COURT: 
5 stand and testify? 
Yes 
Are 
of alcohol < 
your ability to 
MR. 
THE 
EARLE: 
COURT: 
consent? 
MR. 
THE 
EARLE: 
COURT: 
No, 
Are 
Yes, 
, your Honor, I 
not be 
do. 
you presently under the 
3r narcotics or medication 
exercise your free consent? 
your Honor, I am not. 
you doing this 
, your Honor, I 
And not being forcec 
of your 
am. 
I in any 
way? 
MR. EARLE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And understanding that the 
restitution for all matters will be, you will be subject to 
be liable for that restitution. 
MR. EARLE: Yes, your Honor. I will pay. 
THE COURT: How do you plead, sir? 
MR. EARLE: Guilty, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed and execute 
your affidavit. Upon doing so the court will grant the State1 
motion to dismiss count one and count three in 83-1541 and 
amended count one, and dismiss count two in 1542. 
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The record may show the defendant has signed his 
affidavit in open court, it also has been signed by his 
attorney and the attorney for the State, and the court exe-
cutes the same, being in open court in the presence of the 
defendant* 
What is your desire, counsel, regarding sentencing 
MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, we would ask for 
the preparation of a presentence report in this matter. 
THE COURT: And you would waive your 
statutory time? 
MR. BIGGS: Yes, your Honor* 
THE COURT: The Court would ask the clerk 
to set a date. 
THE CLERK: Well, let's see, set it for 
February 21 at 9:00. 
MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, could we make 
it a matter of record that there have been no promises to the 
defendant as to what the sentence will be and it is my under-
standing defense attorney has advised him what the possible 
maximum penalty could be for each count; there have been no 
promises. 
MR. BIGGS: That is correct. That is 
correct. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. BIGGS: Thank you, your Honor. 
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MR, EARLE: Thank you, your Honor. 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
State of Utah 
County of Salt Lake 
) 
) 
) 
ss. 
I, Alan P. Smith, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 38, and one of the Official Court Reporters of the State 
of Utah; that on the 1st day of February, 1984, I attended 
the within matter and recorded in shorthand the proceedings 
had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand notes to 
be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 8, inclusive, constitute a full, true and 
correct account of the same to the best of my ability. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this, _day 
of 
NOTAPYFJBJC 
ALAN P SMITH 
S&Ba'ncDr 
SIC \Si WW 
My C o r - Exp'* 12-4-93 
fesss^sssssssssssssssssssssss& 
'X /%w^ 
an P, Smith, Court Reporter 
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